Exploring New Socio-Economic Thoughts for a Small and Narrow Earth
- 1 Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
Abstract
The earth has been getting smaller and narrower with the expansion of human activities. Now, it is an urgent task for social scientists to explore and study new socio-economic thoughts for this small and narrow earth. This article provides a normative theory and a descriptive theory for the present and future earth. The former is to provide, viewing the earth and human community as unity, evaluations of possible events and of designs of social institutions. The normative theory helps us think about where we should direct the earth. The latter discusses social sciences for practical management of the earth. Since, however, great diversity of cultures will remain, a unified management of the earth is practically impossible. We are required to rethink and develop new socio-economic thoughts in radical manners.
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