Xunzi and Hobbes on the Value Foundation of the Possibility of Morality

Abstract

Xunzi proposed the idea that human nature is “evil” (性恶). Given humanity’s innate tendency toward self-interest, the difficulty lies in explaining how morality becomes possible. Within Xunzi’s theory of human nature, there exists a natural affinity with the Dao, a kind of natural emotion. It is precisely this innate root of natural emotion that enables the sage to accomplish the transformation into moral sentiment. The sage first achieves this moral transformation and, based on it, establishes rites and righteousness (礼义) that accord with human social order. Ordinary people, by simply adhering to these rites and righteousness, can also realize the transformation from desires and emotions into virtue. Xunzi thus establishes a connection between objective reality (“what is”) and moral necessity (“what ought to be”). By mediating through desires and emotions, he reconciles the split between “is” and “ought”, offering a new perspective for addressing Hume’s Problem. Hobbes, on the other hand, establishes mutually binding moral laws based on natural law. The social contract is not a constraint on individual moral behavior, but rather on collective moral behavior. It creates a tension between individual interest and moral action, a tension that effectively mitigates the disadvantages arising from purely individualistic actors. Moral law arises as moral agents, within interactive relationships with others, combine considerations of their own interests to formulate moral norms. In Hobbes’s moral thought, moral agents “invest” their moral conduct in the expectation of future moral feedback; to secure long-term interests, one must adhere to moral principles.