The Structural Limitations of the 2006 Congolese Constitution: Ambiguities, Normative Inconsistencies and Obstacles to Implementation

Abstract

This article analyzes the structural limitations of the 2006 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, demonstrating how its internal ambiguities, normative inconsistencies, and weak implementation contribute to governance instability. The work of numerous authors emphasizes that the main problem lies in the gap between the theoretical ambitions of the text and institutional reality. The empirical study, conducted in 26 provinces, reveals that the population suffers the direct effects of constitutional dysfunctions: routine corruption, territorial inequalities, the absence of truly independent oversight institutions, the bartering of public positions, and the predominance of informal practices over official norms. Interviews show that while some advocate for constitutional revision, many insist on the need to strengthen public ethics, oversight mechanisms, justice, and administrative professionalization. The proposed conceptual framework highlights a causal chain in which textual ambiguities and normative contradictions, combined with political resistance, erode the authority of the law. A comparison with Kenya, South Africa, and Ghana suggests that gradual, technically sound, and politically supported reforms can improve constitutional effectiveness. The article concludes that institutional stability in the DRC depends on a two-pronged approach: clarifying and harmonizing norms, while simultaneously transforming political culture and administrative practices to make the Constitution truly operational.