Research on Fiscal Decentralization, Local Government’s Behavior Preference and Technology Investment Efficiency—Based on Chinese Practice
- 1 College of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
Abstract
The starting point of the fiscal decentralization theory is the efficiency of public goods supply. As one of the major public investment projects of the government, science and technology investment has a great impact on the development of the country and the people’s life. Therefore, based on the practice of Chinese fiscal decentralization, this paper tries to reveal the effect of fiscal decentralization and local government’s behavior preference on science and technology investment efficiency by normative analysis. Through research, it has been found that technology investment requires a huge amount of money and time to produce results. So it is not easy to achieve results in the short term. Under Chinese-style fiscal decentralization, the lack of institutional constraints and reasonable officials’ assessment indicators has led to the alienation of local government’s behavior preference and the loss of the efficiency of science and technology investment.
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