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The Relationship between Reputation and Behavior of Venture Capital Institutions under the Theory of Information Asymmetry
Department of Finance, College of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
- 1 Department of Finance, College of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
American Journal of Industrial and Business Management·Volume 09 (2019)·Pages 315–324·Published 12 February 2019·DOI10.4236/ajibm.2019.92021
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Abstract
With the rapid development of the mobile terminal, the investment around the mobile terminal has stimulated the investment of venture capital institutions to a large extent, and the research on venture capital has been increasing in recent years. Based on asymmetric information theory, to understand the behavior of venture capital from the perspective of reputation, game model, a venture capital and start-ups as well as numerous trade once earnings analysis, the venture capital firm focused on conditions for building a good reputation, and believed that the increase in the number of expected future transactions was an incentive for venture capital institutions to maintain a good reputation.
KeywordsReputation of Venture Capital InstitutionsValue-Added ServicesGame Model
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