Consistent with elections throughout the United States, the majority of contributions in gubernatorial campaigns come from individuals. Understanding the incentives for why individual donors give money in varying political environments is essential for understanding the influence of political donors. Using contribution data from 2009 through 2015, this paper considers whether state campaign finance reform has had unintended effects for how incumbent and non-incumbent candidates raise money. This study demonstrates that individual donations vary in theoretically driven ways. Few factors, however, affect donor generosity more than the relationship between a candidate’s incumbency status and the severity of state contribution laws. Consistent with Jacobson’s early concerns, restrictive contribution laws appear to strengthen the position of incumbents and place non-incumbent candidates at a disadvantage. Where states apply less restrictive limits, however, the advantage held by incumbents among donors largely disappears.
Aldrich, J. H. (1995). Why Parties? The Origins and Transformations of Political Parties in America. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226012773.001.0001
Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. M. (2002). The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000. Election Law Journal, 1, 315-338. https://doi.org/10.1089/153312902760137578
Aranson, P. H., & Hinich, M. J. (1979). Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Election Campaign Contribution Laws. Public Choice, 34, 435-461. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00225679
Barber, M. (2016.) Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology. Political Research Quarterly, 69, 148-159. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915624164
Barber, M. J., Canes-Wrone, B., & Thrower, S. (2017). Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance? American Journal of Political Science, 61, 271-288. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12275
Barber, M. J., Canes-Wrone, B., & Thrower, S. (2019). Campaign Contributions and Donors’ Policy Agreement with Presidential Candidates. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 49, 770-797. https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12609
Bardwell, K. (2003). Campaign Finance Laws and the Competition for Spending in Gubernatorial Elections. Social Science Quarterly, 84, 811-825. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0038-4941.2003.08404003.x
Bonica, A. (2014). Mapping the Ideological Marketplace. American Journal of Political Science, 58, 367-386. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12062
Bonneau, C. W. (2007). Campaign Fundraising in State Supreme Court Elections. Social Science Quarterly, 88, 68-85. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2007.00447.x
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Dow, J. K. (1992). Campaign Contributions in an Unregulated Setting: An Analysis of the 1984 and 1986 California Assembly Elections. Western Political Quarterly, 45, 609-628. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299204500304
Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. Political Analysis, 14, 63-82. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpi014
Brown, A. R. (2013). Does Money Buy Votes? The Case of Self-Financed Gubernatorial Candidates, 1998-2008. Political Behavior, 35, 21-41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-012-9193-1
Brown, A. R., & Jacobson, G. C. (2008). Party, Performance, and Strategic Politicians: The Dynamics of Elections for Senator and Governor in 2006. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 8, 384-409. https://doi.org/10.1177/153244000800800403
Butcher, J., & Milyo, J. (2020). Do Campaign Finance Reforms Insulate Incumbents from Competition? New Evidence from State Legislative Elections. P.S. Political Science & Politics, 53, 460-464. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096520000256
Cox, G. W., & Munger, M. C. (1989). Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections. American Political Science Review, 83, 217-231. https://doi.org/10.2307/1956441
Crespin, M. H., & Deitz, J. L. (2010). If You Can’t Join ‘Em, Beat ‘Em: The Gender Gap in Individual Donations to Congressional Candidates. Political Research Quarterly, 63, 581-593. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909333131
Engstrom, E. J. (2012). The Rise and Decline of Turnout in Congressional Elections: Electoral Institutions, Competition, and Strategic Mobilization. American Journal of Political Science, 56, 373-386. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00556.x
Engstrom, E. J., & Ewell, W. (2010). The Impact of Unified Party Government on Campaign Contributions. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 35, 543-569. https://doi.org/10.3162/036298010793322348
Engstrom, E. J., & Monroe, N. W. (2006). Testing the Basis of Incumbency Advantage: Strategic Candidates and Term Limits in the California Legislature. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 6, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1177/153244000600600101
Ensley, M. (2009). Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology. Public Choice, 138, 221-238. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9350-6
Eom, K., & Gross, D. A. (2006). Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions between Gubernatorial Candidates. Political Research Quarterly, 59, 99-110. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900109
Ferguson, M. (2012). Governors and the Executive Branch. In V. Gray, R. L. Hanson, & T. Kousser (Eds.), Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis (10th ed., pp. 208-250). CQ Press.
Flavin, P. (2015). Campaign Finance Laws, Policy Outcomes, and Political Equality in the American States. Political Research Quarterly, 68, 77-88. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914554041
Francia, P. L., Green, J. C., Herrnson, P. S., Powell, L. W., & Wilcox, C. (2003). The Financiers of Congressional Elections. Columbia University Press.
Gimpel, J. G., Lee, F. E., & Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2008). The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 52, 373-394. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00318.x
Gross, D. A., Goidel, R. K., & Shields, T. G. (2002). State Campaign Finance Regulations and Electoral Competition. American Politics Research, 30, 143-165. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030002002
Hamm, K. E., & Hogan, R. E. (2008). Campaign Finance Laws and Candidacy Decisions in State Legislative Elections. Political Research Quarterly, 61, 458-467. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314646
Harden, J. J. (2011). A Bootstrap Method for Conducting Statistical Inference with Clustered Data. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 11, 223-246. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532440011406233
Jacobson, G. C. (1976). Practical Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform: An Incumbent Protection Act? Public Policy, 24, 1-32.
Jacobson, G. C. (2006). “The Polls”: Polarized Opinion in the States: Partisan Differences in Approval Ratings of Governors, Senators, and George W. Bush. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36, 732-757. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.02578.x
Jacobson, G. C. (2009). The Politics of Congressional Elections (7th ed.). Pearson, Longman Press.
Krasno, J. S., Green, D. P., & Cowden, J. A. (1994). The Dynamics of Campaign Fundraising in House Elections. Journal of Politics, 56, 459-474. https://doi.org/10.2307/2132148
La Raja, R. J. (2008). Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.293864
La Raja, R. J., & Schaffner, B. F. (2015). Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail. University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/ump.13855466.0001.001
Lott, J. R. (2006). Campaign Finance Reform and Electoral Competition. Public Choice, 129, 263-300. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9028-x
Meirowitz, A. (2008). Electoral Contests, Incumbency Advantages, and Campaign Finance. Journal of Politics, 70, 681-699. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608080699
Morton, R., & Cameron, C. (1992). Elections and the Theory of Campaign Contributions: A Survey and Critical Analysis. Economics and Politics, 4, 79-108. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00056.x
Petrocik, J. R., & Desposato, S. W. (2004). Incumbency and Short-Term Influences on Voters. Political Research Quarterly, 57, 363-373. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290405700302
Ramsden, G. P. (2002). State Legislative Campaign Finance Research: A Review Essay. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 2, 176-198. https://doi.org/10.1177/153244000200200204
Ray, D., & Havick, J. (1981). A Longitudinal Analysis of Party Competition in State Legislative Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 25, 119-128. https://doi.org/10.2307/2110916
Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. Macmillan Publishing Company.
Snyder, J. M. (1993). The Market for Campaign Contributions: Evidence for the U.S. Senate 1980-1986. Economics and Politics, 5, 219-240. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00076.x
Squire, P. (1992). Challenger Profile and Gubernatorial Elections. Western Political Quarterly, 45, 125-142. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299204500109
Stratmann, T. (2010). Do Low Contribution Limits Insulate Incumbents from Competition? Election Law Journal, 9, 125-140. https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2009.0038
Stratmann, T., & Aparicio-Castillo, F. J. (2006). Competition Policy for Elections: Do Campaign Contribution Limits Matter? Public Choice, 127, 177-206. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-1252-x
Weber, R. E., Tucker, H., & Brace, P. (1991). Vanishing Marginals in State Legislative Elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16, 29-47. https://doi.org/10.2307/439965