Phenomenological Attitude in Jurisdictional Provision: A Bridge between Phenomenology and Law

Abstract

The study seeks an approximation of the basic concepts of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, his essential categories, as well as his specific method of phenomenological reduction, questioning its applicability to law, especially as an attitude in the state’s jurisdictional activity, in the context of production of evidence with the implementation of the Husserlian epoché , suspending pre-understandings and prejudices, in search of the essence of the phenomena. The question is, therefore, how it is possible to apply Husserl’s approach to law and whether it would be appropriate to carry out phenomenological reductions at the time of jurisdictional provision, to reach the essence of phenomena that involve human nature. It is concluded that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction proves to be feasible within the scope of the judicial process and allows the figure of the magistrate to be assumed from the perspective of an observer and not a mere interpreter of the lived world of the subject to whom the legal norm is addressed, in order to provide greater authenticity in the knowledge of phenomena and, therefore, greater legal certainty.