Constitutionalizing Political Loyalty: A Critical Examination of the Anti-Defection Law from the Bangladesh’s Constitutional Landscape

Abstract

The anti-defection law, as embodied in Article 70 of the constitution of Bangladesh, is a critical component of the democratic system aimed at maintaining stability in the legislature and promoting accountability among elected representatives. However, the anti-defection law has often been criticized for containing elements that are not in line with the principles of parliamentary democracy. This paper investigates the evolution and necessity of such a law, emphasizing that political defections are frequent events in developing countries like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. As a result, these countries have included anti-defection clauses in their constitutions, learning from their turbulent pasts. The author aims to examine the anti-defection law in detail and explore its paradoxical implications on the functioning of both legislative and executive branches of the government. This paper sheds insight into the intricate connection between legal provisions and political dynamics in the context of Bangladesh through an in-depth investigation, which responds to the ongoing discussion on constitutionalizing political loyalty. Additionally, the author has provided a comparative analysis to shed light on how defections are handled in other countries, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan. The author aims to demonstrate in the present study how anti-defection provisions undermine the goals of the constitution by violating the principles of parliamentary democracy. Finally, the paper proposes recommendations for reforming Article 70 of the Bangladesh Constitution to address concerns related to defection, striving to strike a balance between political flexibility and the integrity of the democratic institutions.