Jurisprudence and Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science

Abstract

This paper examines the status of law as a science through the lens of Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science. While jurisprudence is commonly taught as a branch of legal sciences, Popper’s criteria for scientific theory—falsifiability—challenges this view. According to Popper, a theory must make testable predictions that can be proven true or false, a requirement that law fails to meet due to its reliance on subjective interpretation. Using Popper’s framework, this study explores the nature of jurisprudence, considering insights from influential legal scholars such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, and Suri Ratnapala. The research suggests that law is not a science but rather a pseudo-science, given its flexibility and dependence on individual judgment. The paper concludes that jurisprudence should be understood as an operational tool rather than a scientific discipline, with its primary function being the guidance of legal practice and decision-making rather than objective prediction.