Would the Judiciary Deciding by the Toss of a Coin Be a Better Option for Brazil?

Abstract

The article explores the dilemma between speed and judicial accuracy in the Brazilian judicial system. The sluggishness of legal proceedings is identified as one of the main problems, with the average duration of a case in Brazil exceeding seven years. This delay undermines access to justice and public confidence in the legal system. The study highlights the importance of balancing efficiency and decision quality, recognizing that delayed justice is a form of injustice. Game theory is introduced as a tool to examine the current dynamics of the Brazilian judicial system. While this theory has insurmountable limitations for directly resolving conflicts submitted to the judiciary, it serves as a valuable instrument for understanding strategic interactions within the system and may be useful in improving its institutional design. The article proposes reforms that prioritize efficiency without compromising decision quality, such as simplifying procedures and strengthening consensual dispute resolution methods. Public participation in defining judicial policies is also suggested as a means to enhance the system’s transparency and efficiency.