The objective of this study is to propose alternative structures for the regulation of electricity and, consequently, for the whole energy sector, taking into account new variables posed by the energy transition. This article is grounded mainly in scholarly literature from law and economics, corporate law, regulatory law and collective action theories, but places them in a new perspective with the support of ESG and energy transition literature. The main methodology adopted for this study was review and discussion of scholarly work. The results obtained indicate that the traditional models proposed to deal with electricity regulation are insufficient to address new challenges brought by energy transition, and propose a new, innovative model based on a shared-ownership structure. The study’s implications are significant for policymakers, private agents and for governmental agents in the energy sector. The regulatory model proposed has implications for the relationship between the general public and the directions of energy policy and governance. This study contributes to the literature by proposing an innovative regulatory model, which was built upon previous studies in the fields of energy regulation, corporate governance and collective action.
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