Insensitivity to Unethical Behavior in Dictator Game When Indirectly Intermediated-Implications of Indirect Blindness for Safety Management
- 1 Department of Intelligent Mechanical Systems, Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology, Okayama University, Okayama, Japan
Abstract
The aim of this study was to demonstrate that indirect mediation in behaviors leads to insensitivity to unethical behavior through a dictator game and to give some implications for safety management. The indirect involvement in the unethical behavior such as the violation of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility and the criticism from others for the unethical behavior as compared to the direct involvement in it. The instruction condition for the evaluator of behavior in a dictator game was taken up as an experimental variable. Instruction condition 1 was to pay attention to the behavior of only a dictator. In instruction condition 2, the participant (evaluator) was required to review all players’ behavior and evaluate a dictator. It has been investigated whether allowing indirect actions (mediations) leads to reduced punishment as a function of the instruction condition. While the punishment to the indirectness did not get smaller for instruction condition 2, the punishment to the indirectness tended to get smaller only for instruction condition 1.
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