Reengineering Payment Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Blockchain-Based Systems for Liquidity Optimization and Systemic Risk Reduction
- 1 Department of Economics, Binghamton University, Binghamton, USA
- 2 Department of Accounting and Finance, Southern Utah University, Cedar City, USA
- 3 Inventive Apps Ltd., Dhaka, Bangladesh
- 4 MBA & MSIT, Emporia State University, Emporia, USA
- 5 MSIT, Emporia State University, Emporia, USA
- 6 School of Computing, University of South Alabama, Mobile, USA
Abstract
Digital payment systems are frequently perceived as real-time, yet underlying settlement processes often remain delayed and fragmented across institutional ledgers. This separation generates liquidity inefficiencies, operational frictions, and systemic risk through the accumulation of unsettled obligations. This study examines whether blockchain-based settlement systems can improve the economic performance of payment networks by enhancing liquidity efficiency and reducing systemic risk. The paper develops a formal model that conceptualizes payment settlement as a networked coordination problem characterized by settlement delays, information asymmetry, and process fragmentation. The analysis compares traditional delayed settlement systems with blockchain-enabled real-time settlement architectures within a simulation-based empirical framework calibrated to stylized interbank payment networks. The simulation environment incorporates alternative network structures, transaction volumes, settlement delays, and adoption levels to evaluate how settlement architecture influences liquidity demand, exposure dynamics, reconciliation frictions, and contagion propagation. The results indicate that blockchain-based settlement substantially reduces intraday liquidity requirements by minimizing the accumulation of unsettled payment obligations. Real-time settlement also compresses the duration of counterparty exposure, thereby limiting the propagation of financial distress across institutions. These effects become more pronounced in high-volume and densely connected networks and exhibit nonlinear gains as adoption increases. Robustness analysis further indicates that the core findings remain stable across alternative network configurations, stress conditions, and parameter specifications. The study contributes to payment economics by demonstrating that the relationship between liquidity efficiency and systemic risk depends critically on settlement architecture rather than representing a fixed structural trade-off. It further contributes to information systems research by linking distributed ledger infrastructure design to macro-financial outcomes, including coordination efficiency and systemic resilience. The findings suggest that blockchain-based settlement systems may provide a viable pathway toward more efficient and resilient financial networks when implemented within coordinated and institutionally governed environments.
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