Effect of Firm Structure on Corporate Cash Holding (Evidence from Non-Financial Companies)
- 1 School of Economics, Henan University, Kaifeng, China
- 2 School of Economics, Henan University, Kaifeng, China
- 3 College of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China
- 4 College of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China
- 5 Institute of Business and Management Sciences, The University of Agriculture, Peshawar, Pakistan
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of firm structure (whether diversified or focused firms) on corporate cash holding. Samples of 80 non-financial companies were selected including diversified and focused firms which were listed on Karachi stock exchange for a period 7 years from 2006 to 2013. These diversified and focused firms were selected on the basis of equal proportionate method. Random effect model and descriptive statistics were used for the analysis of these variables. The results of these models showed that there is negative and significant effect of firm structure on corporate cash holding. We also find negative and significant relationship of leverage and Networking capital with the corporate cash holdings and the relation between growth opportunities and corporate cash holding was examined to be positive and significant. We also find a negative and insignificant relationship between firm size and corporate cash holding. The descriptive statistics showed that there was significant difference between the cash holding of diversified and focused firms. The diversified firms keep a smaller amount of cash as compare to the single segment companies (focused firms), which is in support of the trade-off theory. This paper contributes to current literatures with regard to organization structure (whether diversified or focused firms) on cash holding in a developing economy like Pakistan.
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