Formulating and Supporting a Hypothesis to Address a Catch-22 Situation in 6G Communication Networks

Abstract

2030 is projected as the year for the launch of the 6G (sixth generation) telecommunication technology. It is also the year predicted to introduce quantum computers powerful enough to break current cryptography algorithms. Cryptography remains the mainstay of securing the Internet and the 6G networks. Post quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms are currently under development and standardization by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) and other regulatory agencies. PQC deployment will make the 6G goals of very low latency and low cost almost unachievable, as most PQC algorithms rely on keys much larger than those in classical RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) algorithms. The large PQC keys consume more storage space and processing power, increasing the latency and costs of their implementation. Thus, PQC deployment may compromise the latency and pricing goals of 6G networks. Moreover, all the PQC candidates under NIST evaluation have so far failed, seriously jeopardizing their standardization and placing the security of 6G against the Q-Day threat in a catch-22 situation. This report formulates a research question and builds and supports a research hypothesis to explore an alternate absolute zero trust (AZT) security strategy for securing 6G networks. AZT is autonomous, fast, and low-cost.