Principles of Constructing a Correct Microscopic Theory

Abstract

In our time, experimental physicists have obtained data on a very large number of phenomena and objects of the physical world. Very rarely there is a situation when theoretical physicists do not have enough experimental data to understand some known fundamental law of Nature. This situation arose almost a hundred years ago and sparked a discussion between A. Einstein and N. Bohr on the probabilistic nature of microcosm phenomena. From the time, it seemed that most physicists are inclined to believe that the proponents of a quantum explanation of the randomness of the phenomena of radioactive decay are right. Now this problem has been solved experimentally. The results of these measurements [1] show that A. Einstein and other proponents of determinism were right. In most cases, theoretical models are based on some already existing experimental data and are intended to explain them. At the same time, in the twentieth century, among microscopic, well-mathematically based models, there were several that raise doubts about their correctness, since they cannot explain a number of other experimental data that can be attributed to the fundamentally important properties of the studied objects [2] [3]. Therefore, the usual criterion for the correctness of the theory, which consists of its agreement with the measurement data, is ambiguous in this case. An additional criterion for the correctness of a microscopic theory can be formulated if it is assumed that the microscopic theory must be quantum one. The coefficients of quantum equations are world constants. Therefore, the solutions of these equations must be equalities made up of world constants only. For this reason, a correct microscopic model must rely on equalities consisting of world constants only. This criterion is shown to work successfully for models of superfluidity and superconductivity, for models of a number of particles, and models of the star interior.