An Improved Simultaneous-Revelation Resolution Procedure that Induces Truthfulness
- 1 Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei,China
- 2 Department of the Basics, Air Force Radar Academy, Wuhan, Hubei, China
- 3 Department of the Basics, Air Force Radar Academy, Wuhan, Hubei, China
- 4 Institute of Computer Technology, Wuhan Institute of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, China.
Abstract
Alternating-offer bargaining protocol is the most predominant way for solving bilateral bargaining problem in daily life. However, alternating-offer consumed more time and caused a lower efficiency in some cases. One proposed solution is called simultaneous-revelation resolution by which both parties reveal their reservation prices at the same time. But most simultaneous-revelation resolution procedures are inefficient because they encourage exaggerations. But it is fast and uncomplicated, this resolution procedure still has merit—especially if the parties can refrain from undue exaggera-tion. The paper designs a truthful mechanism for simultaneous-offer bargaining negotiation. In this mechanism, a rule manipulator can induce buyer and seller both to reveal their real prices by introducing suitable adjustment functions. And we show the honest revelations are in Nash equilibrium.
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