In the mobile crowdsensing of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), in order to improve the amount of data collection, an effective method to attract a large number of vehicles is needed. Therefore, the incentive mechanism plays a dominant role in the mobile crowdsensing of vehicular ad hoc networks. In addition, the behavior of providing malicious data by vehicles as data collectors will have a huge negative impact on the whole collection process. Therefore, participants need to be encouraged to provide data honestly to obtain more available data. In order to increase data collection and improve the availability of collected data, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing in vehicular ad hoc networks named V-IMCS. Specifically, the Stackelberg game model, Lloyd’s clustering algorithm and reputation management mechanism are used to balance the competitive relationship between participants and process the data according to the priority order, so as to improve the amount of data collection and encourage participants to honestly provide data to obtain more available data. In addition, the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism is verified by a series of simulations. The simulation results show that the amount of available data is significantly higher than the existing incentive mechanism while improving the amount of data collection.
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