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Impact of Market Concentration on the Stability of the Banking Sector in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)
Faculty of Economic Sciences and Laboratory of Economic and Social Research and Studies (LARES), University Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville, Congo
Faculty of Economic Sciences and Laboratory of Economic and Social Research and Studies (LARES), University Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville, Congo
Faculty of Economic Sciences and Laboratory of Economic and Social Research and Studies (LARES), University Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville, Congo
- 1 Faculty of Economic Sciences and Laboratory of Economic and Social Research and Studies (LARES), University Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville, Congo
- 2 Faculty of Economic Sciences and Laboratory of Economic and Social Research and Studies (LARES), University Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville, Congo
- 3 Faculty of Economic Sciences and Laboratory of Economic and Social Research and Studies (LARES), University Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville, Congo
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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of banking market concentration on the stability of the banking sector in the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC). Using panel data from 2005 to 2015 and the system GMM technique, it is found that deposit and credit market concentration have a destabilizing effect on the banking system. Thus, it would be desirable to put in place mechanisms that can help reduce the market power of certain banks to guarantee banking stability.
KeywordsBanking ConcentrationFinancial StabilityGMMCEMAC
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