Impact of Female Executive on Investment Efficiency of Listed Companies in Shanghai Stock Market: A Case of Over-Investment
- 1 School of Management, Shinawatra University, Banhkok, Thailand
- 2 School of Management, Shinawatra University, Banhkok, Thailand
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationships between the presence of female in top management teams and over-investment behavior of listed companies. This study draws on Richardson’s (2006) model and selects A-share listed companies from the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2018 as a research sample. After eliminating the financial listed companies and missing data samples, 725 sample companies were used for statistical analysis. The result shows that 1) the existence of female top management can effectively inhibit the occurrence of over-investment behavior of the company. 2) The higher the proportion of female senior executives, the less likely the listed company’s over-investment behavior will occur. The research in this paper will provide new ideas for the effectiveness of China’s listed companies to strengthen the internal governance mechanism, provide a broader direction for the study of investment theory, and also promote the transformation of the company’s human capital management practices.
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