Research of the Government Optimal Decision-Making of Energy Consumption
- 1 School of Economics and Management, Beijing Institute of Petrochemical Technology, Beijing, China
- 2 Research Center of Energy Environment and Low Carbon Development, Beijing Institute of Petrochemical Technology, Beijing, China
Abstract
A dynamic optimization model and association analysis of data mining are used to analyze the main factors affecting the energy consumption decision of local government and the relations among those factors from the theoretical and empirical perspectives. The findings show that the energy consumption decisions of local government will vary in cycles along with local government political shuffle for gaining a better performance evaluation, and there is a deviation between the energy consumption decisions made by local government and the long-range energy consumption control policies of central government. To solve this principal-agent problem between central government and local government, a more scientific constraint encouraging mechanism and overall consideration of regional economic development mechanism should be designed to eliminate the difference between the short-run optimal energy consumption control decision of local government and the long-run energy policy of central government.
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