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The Financing of Public Hospitals in Senegal: Taking into Account the Asymmetry of Information
CESAG (African Center for Graduate Studies in Management), Research Laboratory in Economics of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Senegal
Gaston Berger University of Saint-Louis (UGB), Research Laboratory in Economics of Saint-Louis (LARES), Saint-Louis, Senegal
- 1 CESAG (African Center for Graduate Studies in Management), Research Laboratory in Economics of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Senegal
- 2 Gaston Berger University of Saint-Louis (UGB), Research Laboratory in Economics of Saint-Louis (LARES), Saint-Louis, Senegal
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Abstract
The objective of our study was to analyze the information asymmetry that exists between the state and public hospitals in Senegal. The use of a theoretical model to highlight hospital regulation has led to a number of important results. Indeed, the optimal solution consists in introducing a distortion in the cost reduction effort required to achieve an arbitrage between productive efficiency and the extraction of the hospital’s rent. The use of a menu of non-linear contracts for hospital funding is consistent with a cost reimbursement policy (such as the overall envelope policy) while a menu of linear contracts is modelled on the fixed-price pricing system (for example, by pathology or activity).
KeywordsPublic HospitalFinancingInformation AsymmetrySenegal
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