Effective Availability in Global Semiconductor Trade: Assessing U.S. Supply Chain Risks and Policy Response
- 1 VentureLab Business & Economics, Phoenix, USA
- 2 College of Arts and Sciences, Cornell University, Ithaca, USA
Abstract
This paper examines the concept of effective availability in global semiconductor trade, with a focus on the United States’ dependence on imported semiconductor inputs. Semiconductors—critical to advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and defense industries—present both economic opportunities and strategic vulnerabilities due to the geographic concentration of supply. The study develops an effective availability framework that incorporates supplier diversification, tariff-equivalent restrictions, and geopolitical risk. Drawing on trade data, tariff measures, and industry reports, the analysis shows that although U.S. reliance on East Asia remains significant, recent policy interventions such as the CHIPS and Science Act (U.S. Congress, 2022) and targeted trade measures have begun reshaping sourcing patterns. Effective availability rose through 2023 before moderating in 2024, remaining above pre-2022 levels as imports diversified toward Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. The paper concludes that semiconductor resilience is not achieved through self-sufficiency but through diversified, trade-embedded supply chains supported by balanced and coordinated policy actions.
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