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Strategic Interaction and Charitable Fundraising
School of Development Economics, National Institute of Development Administration
Department of Economics, University of Ottawa
- 1 School of Development Economics, National Institute of Development Administration
- 2 Department of Economics, University of Ottawa
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Abstract
This paper studies strategic interaction between rival charities providing multiple public goods, highlighting the role of fundraising campaigns in influencing donor decision-making. The analysis suggests that, even when charities honor donor designation, social welfare may be higher in equilibrium when charities solicit donors sequentially, rather than simultaneously or through a United Fund.
KeywordsNon-profitCharitiesStrategic Interaction
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