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Package Licenses in Patent Pools with Basic and Optional Patents
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, The University of Kitakyusyu, Kitakyushu, Japan
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
- 1 Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, The University of Kitakyusyu, Kitakyushu, Japan
- 2 Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
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Abstract
Patent pools are established by the patent holders in order to promote R & D and technological standards, etc. This pa per investigates the patent holders’ incentive to form a patent pool, the patent pool’s licensing behavior, and the anti competitive effect of a patent pool. Our model is characterized by the following two features. First, we consider the different two types of patent: basic and optional. Second, we consider a patent pool that offers two types of a package license: single and multiple. Our results yield some implications for a patent pool that is characterized by the comple mentarity between basic and optional patents.
KeywordsBasic and Optional PatentsPatent PoolsPatent Pool PricingSingle and Multiple Package Licenses
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