Corporate Governance, Financial Constraint, and Value of Cash Holdings: Research from the Perspective of Ultimate Controllers

Abstract

This paper takes into consideration the character of China as an emerging market and distinguishes between the ultimate-controller trait of the central government and the local government. This paper conducts the analysis using the corporate governance and financial character perspectives, based on agency theory and financial constraint theory. The findings show that corporate governance is the main reason for values of cash holdings of SOEs are lower than those of private firms. Moreover, values of cash holdings of SOEs controlled by the central government are higher than those of cash holdings of firms controlled by local governments. The difference could be attributed to the observation that central government-controlled SOEs have better governance and investment opportunities compared with the local government- controlled ones. The objectives of this paper are to determine the factors influencing the difference between cash holdings of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms, and to analyze the influence of governments at different levels on value of cash holdings of SOEs in China. Results of the analysis are expected to aid in understanding of how corporate governance and financial constraint affect value of cash holdings of firms.