Officials’ Rotation, Economic Growth and Environmental Accidents: Do They Affect the Political Promotion?
- 1 School of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
Abstract
Using the rotation of Chinese officials based on handle-collected data from political process of provincial officials in China from 1992 to 2012 , t his paper examines the influence of officials’ rotation, economic development and environmental accidents on the provincial officials’ promotion probability. The results are as following: 1) officials’ rotation and economic growth have a significant positive influence on the provincial officials’ promotion probability, and the officials’ rotation is more sensitive to the provincial officials’ promotion probability. 2) Environmental accident s have a significant negative influence on the provincial officials’ promotion. When three variables co-exist, the influence of economic development is not significant. 3) The results of different sub-samples based on the provincial officials’ types and regions are different.
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