An Empirical Investigation of Competitive Exam Based Selection and Placement of Managerial Public Officials in Vietnam: Is It a Cure or a Curse?

Abstract

Competitive exams, selection, and placement of high-ranking public officials used to be resorted only by Vietnam’s feudal dynasties. After half a century of abandonment, this practice seems to have made its spectacular comeback in the recent decade. In a quest for high caliber public personnel, the Vietnamese government believes that competitiveness-base exams would help select, recruit and place right public servants into the right job. This research was conducted to figure out to what extent the selected high-ranking post holders were different from the public service employers. Based on face-to-face interviews with candidates and the heads of public services employers who were going to place the selected ones onto the managerial posts, data were gathered for Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis with the use of structured 5 point-Likert scale questionnaire in the field surveys. Findings showed that there existed a difference in the perceptions towards the fairness of the competitive exams among these two types of interviewees. By comparing SEM coefficients, several recommendations were drawn for policy makers and managers to modernize this type of recruitment, selection and placement of managerial public servants on the intended job positions.