The Impact of Bank Loan on Executive Perquisites under the Background of Post-Split-Share Reform
- 1 Department of Finance, School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China
- 2 Department of Finance, School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China
- 3 Department of Finance, School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China
- 4 Department of Finance, School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China
- 5 Department of Finance, School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China
Abstract
Executive Perquisites are agency cost and harm the interests of shareholders. After the split share reform, the first largest shareholder has decreasing his shares and the problem of executives’ expropriation has been more prominent. This paper uses the data of Chinese listed firms during 2006 to 2017 and investigates the corporate governance effect of bank loan on executive perquisites. The results show that bank loan can constraint the executive perquisites which have corporate governance effects; the corporate governance effect of bank loan has more prominent in Non-SOEs than in SOEs; and the corporate governance effect of bank loan has more prominent in the listed firm with higher proportion of share of the first largest shareholder. So the conclusions provide empirical evidence not only for the discussion of commercial bank reform but also for the corporate governance reform of Chinese listed firms under the financial systems of main bank financing.
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