A Theory of Epistemic Justification Based on Cause and Reason

Abstract

Since Gettier published his famous “ Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? ” , epi stemologists (including Gettier) have referred to “Epistemic Justification 1 ” as “having good reason to believe ” and a series of discussions around Justification, but in this article, I will argue that the previous understanding of Justification is inadequate and that “Justification” as a necessary condition for knowledge should itself contain at least two connotations, “Reasons” and “Causes”. I will show that my point of view can be supported by at least two reasons. First, “having good reason to believe ” as a normative understanding of justification is not sufficient for the definition of knowledge, and it is weaker compared to reliabilism of justification, which argues justification is not even a necessary condition for knowledge. Second, if we accept that “Justification” should be interpreted as “having good cause to believe” , we will be unable to escape a kind of skepticism named Agrrippa’s Skepticism (AS), which accuses all Justifications are impossible, is a type of skepticism about Justification. In this article, I will show that 1 ) “Justification” is a necessary condition for knowledge, so, “Justification” must mean more than merely “having sufficient cause to believe” . 2 ) What AS presupposed is this traditional theory of Justification, and if we wish to prevent AS, we cannot simply interpret “justification” as “have a good reason to believe” . 3 ) Explain whether a new understanding of Justification, compatible with Cause and Reason, is possible.