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Models, Representation and Truth: On Giere’s Perspectival Realism
Autonomous University of Queretaro, Santiago de Querétaro, Mexico
- 1 Autonomous University of Queretaro, Santiago de Querétaro, Mexico
Open Journal of Philosophy·Volume 12 (2022)·Pages 474–488·Published 14 June 2022·DOI10.4236/ojpp.2022.123031
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Abstract
Could relativist theses about scientific theories be coherent with realist theses about the relationship between such theories and the physical world? This is the central issue of this paper that we approach, mainly, on Giere’s perspectival realism. We consider that his epistemological relativist theses are plausible and sustainable, but his realist thesis about the representational role that plays the theoretical models with respect to real systems as well as his thesis about true hypotheses are not. After trying to show that, we delineate an epistemological version of conceptual relativism which becomes cognate with Giere’s perspectival claims but that it does not comprise realist claims.
KeywordsTheory-DependenceIndependent WorldConceptual SystemOntological Commitment
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