Absence of Embodied Subject in the History of Philosophy
- 1 Healthcare Management Department, Arden University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- 2 Healthcare Management Department, Arden University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Abstract
There have been several important breakthroughs in the fields of philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and neuroscience in recent centuries. Despite their complexities and varying opinions in each field, the majority of these breakthroughs tend to view human consciousness as a concrete reality influenced by physiological, social, and environmental factors. This raises the question of why such a dominant perspective did not prevail throughout the history of philosophy and why there were inclinations to deny it. Additionally, why did great philosophers throughout history reject the notion of embodied knowledge, which is a revolutionary approach in both philosophy and neuroscience and holds significant implications across diverse fields, from educational sciences to artificial intelligence? In this paper, we explore the reasons behind these questions. Firstly, we trace the origins of this perspective back to ancient Greek philosophers, including figures like Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. Next, we examine the reasons for the continuation of this line of thought among modern philosophers, including prominent figures like Descartes and Kant. Lastly, we delve into the approaches and attitudes of pioneering philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who diverged from the mainstream and emphasized the significance of the body in knowledge and consciousness. Understanding the historical neglect of embodiment in philosophy is essential to fully grasp the complexities of human consciousness. By incorporating insights from both historical and contemporary perspectives, we can gain a deeper understanding of the embodied nature of knowledge and its far-reaching impact on various philosophical, scientific, and practical domains.
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