Moral Dualism and the Problem of Evil

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to argue against moral dualism in the understanding of the nature of evil, namely the conception of evil as an independent source of guidance, in opposition to the good, rather than a failure in pursuit of an apparent good. Focusing on moral evil as the intentional infliction of gratuitous pain and suffering by one human being on another, i.e., pain and suffering that are not required by a morally acceptable purpose, I argue against two forms of such dualism. Value dualism divides moral value into antithetical normative principles, good and evil, each with its own guiding power. On this view, evil can intelligibly be pursued for its own sake, rather than a failure of some kind in acting &#8220;under the guise of the good.&#8221; Agent dualism divides human agents, based on character and disposition, into followers of good and followers of evil. On this view, the pursuit of evil can be accounted for in terms of basic character traits and dispositions, not related to more fundamental motives, reasons, or choices. In both versions humanity is divided into two moral classes. I argue that the two forms of moral dualism discussed in this paper fail to render evil perpetrators intelligible in terms of reasons for action. While suggesting, in line with accounts by <a href="#ref5">Arendt (1951, </a><a href="#ref6">1963, </a><a href="#ref7">1978)</a>, <a href="#ref2">Anscombe (1963)</a> and <a href="#ref22">Neiman (2002)</a>, a non-dualist account of evil-doing as a dysfunction in the pursuit of intelligible goals, I will go on to criticize dualistic views of both kinds in the work of philosophers such as <a href="#ref24">Velleman (1992)</a>, <a href="#ref23">Silber (2012)</a>, <a href="#ref11">Bernstein (2002)</a>, <a href="#ref16">Hacker (2021)</a>, and <a href="#ref19">Kekes (1990)</a>.