Atomic Propositions in the Philosophy of Language
- 1 College of Foreign Languages, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
Abstract
Atomic propositions and their properties are the core of the philosophy of language. To define atomic propositions, it is necessary to clarify their nature. To this end, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein tried to understand the nature of atomic propositions by examining their unity. The question of the unity of atomic propositions has not been uniformly resolved, however. Frege and Russell largely agreed on the category and role of propositions, thinking that the object represented by a proposition is a Platonic abstract entity, but they had different understandings of the unity of propositions. Wittgenstein took a different approach, holding that the object of a proposition representation is the linguistic picture entity. Based on this understanding, the problem of examining the unity of atomic propositions becomes the problem of examining the representation form and content of the proposition, thus avoiding the formal ontology of propositions. Atomic propositions are the basic unit formed by the cognitive subject in the activity of representing the world, and their nature is the unity of the transcendental intentionality of the cognitive subject and the experiential activity.
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