World-Dependable Existence in Modal Meinongianism

Abstract

In this paper, I propose an interpretation for the semantics of intentionality that Graham Priest uses in constructing his Modal Meinongianism, in Towards Non-Being . More precisely, I will focus only on the issue of existence as a metaphysical notion. In this regard, my claim is that the monadic predicate of existence is not capable of constructing a full-fledged metaphysical notion of existence, or, in other words, it is not well equipped to account for all the modes of being that Modal Meinongianism implies. In trying to support my claim, I will use a strategy of reasoning that employs a hierarchical conceptual structure, meaning that there are some primary concepts that determine the meaning of all the others. In this case, noneism is the primary notion. By using this type of reasoning, I will conclude that existence can be interpreted as world-dependable, meaning that the ontological nature of a world determines the ontological nature of the objects in its domain. In this case, existence can be seen as simple membership in a particular world.