The Participant Stance and the View from Nowhere: Reconciling Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes with Agent-Neutral Morality

Abstract

This paper explores the apparent tension between P. F. Strawson’s reactive attitude framework—rooted in the interpersonal, participant stance—and the agent-neutral ideals found in utilitarian and deontological moral theories. While Strawson emphasizes emotionally embedded responses like resentment and gratitude as essential to moral responsibility, agent-neutral theories demand impartiality and universal justification. The paper critically examines three central points of friction: the partiality of reactive attitudes, the naturalistic insulation of Strawson’s framework from external rational critique, and the potential for moral correction based on impartial principles. It argues that reconciliation is possible through reflective equilibrium, viewing reactive attitudes as epistemically significant but revisable, and by delineating a division of moral labor: Strawson’s account captures the practice of moral responsibility, while agent-neutral theories provide normative criteria. Ultimately, the paper defends a dynamic, interpretive compatibility that honors both the engaged, affective reality of moral life and the aspirational impartiality of ethical theory.