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On the Ability Hypothesis Reply to the Knowledge Argument
Department of Philosophy, School of Historical Studies, Birkbeck University of London, London, UK
- 1 Department of Philosophy, School of Historical Studies, Birkbeck University of London, London, UK
Open Journal of Philosophy·Volume 15 (2025)·Pages 567–574·Published 11 July 2025·DOI10.4236/ojpp.2025.153034
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Abstract
This paper has critically assessed the Ability Hypothesis reply to the Knowledge Argument. By means of a modified version of Mary’s Room, which is based upon an adaptation of Albert Einstein’s thought experiment for Principle of Equivalence, the insufficiency of the Ability Hypothesis and its failed attempt to block the Knowledge Argument have been demonstrated. In addition, it has been revealed that a possible loophole due to ignorance exists in the Knowledge Argument for new scientific findings are yet to come to challenge our current concepts of physical reality.
KeywordsAbility HypothesisKnowledge ArgumentMary’s RoomThought Experiment
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