Philosophy’s Recurrent Problem: Language Confusion

Abstract

It has been demonstrated by a host of Analytic philosophers that language imprecision and equivocation have been sources of confusion on many philosophical issues. This paper explores five such issues, and attempts to not only scrutinize the confusion, but further to show that once this is done, we can make progress on the issues themselves. First, the word “think” has various definitions which lead to diverse conclusions on whether computers or AI can or will think, and whether we do or will have duties to computers or AI. Second, Hume’s misunderstanding of “identity” when referring to “personal identity” caused him to mistakenly conclude that the self or personal identity was a fiction. Third, there are dueling and incompatible definitions of free will offered by the libertarian and the compatibilist which unnecessarily muddy the waters on the issue of whether we have free will or not. Fourth, Paley’s comparison of the order displayed by a watch and the order displayed in the universe failed to notice that a substantially different type of order is found in each one, and that the type of order found in the universe can be explained naturalistically and need not rely on an appeal to a maker (or a metaphysical creator such as God) unlike a watch which does need and have a creator or maker. Last, Sartre’s differentiation of Christian and atheistic existentialists was based on a failure to notice that when he referred to human “essence” he was conflating two very different types of essence, specifically, innate essence and character essence. Sartre’s equivocation error led him to mistakenly conclude that the religious person and the atheist have different views on existentialist issues.