Revisiting the State of War: A Critique of Hobbesian Premises through the Lenses of Game Theory and Evolutionary Biology
- 1 School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
Abstract
The “state of war” proposed by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan is examined, with emphasis on the extreme scenarios he posits and their potential social consequences. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove game, and the Stag Hunt as analytical lenses, the limits of Hobbesian assumptions are evaluated in light of modern evolutionary theory and game theory, including insights on kin selection, reciprocity, reputation, and multi-level selection. Paradoxical reasoning in Hobbes’s treatment of rationality, including the second-order free-rider problem, is identified, indicating a lack of internal consistency under specified premises. The role of extreme baseline assumptions in biasing inference about cooperation, social order, and authority is clarified, and testable propositions are articulated to distinguish Hobbesian predictions from evolutionary models of cooperation. The analysis culminates in a revised understanding of the state as a form of cultural scaffolding for pre-existing cooperative instincts, rather than a de novo creator of social order. Finally, the trade-off between theoretical comprehensiveness and analytical incisiveness is assessed, and avenues for integrating mechanism-based explanations with normative analysis for an empirically responsible political philosophy are outlined.
- Abizadeh, A. (2011). Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory. American Political Science Review, 105, 298-315. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055411000098
- Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso.
- Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books.
- Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted Mind (pp. 163-228). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195060232.003.0004
- Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Harvard University Press.
- Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I & II. Journal of Theoretical Biology , 7 , 1-52.
- Hampton, J. (1986). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625060
- Henrich, J. (2016). The Secret of Our Success : How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter . Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873296
- Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan; Or, the Matter, Forme , & Power of a Common-Wealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill . Printed for A. Crooke. https://doi.org/10.5479/sil.59773.39088001833995
- Kavka, G. S. (1986). Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton University Press.
- Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity. Nature, 437, 1291-1298. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04131
- Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press.
- Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139165228
- Smith, J. M. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511806292
- Trivers, R. L. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57. https://doi.org/10.1086/406755
- Wilson, D. S., & Sober, E. (1994). Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 585-608. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00036104