Keeping Wonder Alive: Philosophy as Critical Practice
- 1 Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel
Abstract
Many philosophers have reflected upon philosophy’s lack of progress in converging upon truth and its chronic condition of irresolvable disagreement. These reflections raise questions about the possibility of philosophical knowledge. Some philosophers remain “optimists” regarding these issues, believing that philosophical progress and knowledge are possible, some are “pessimists,” denying the possibility of progress and knowledge, and some attempt to “segregate” metaphilosophical skepticism, while leaving open a conceptual space for first-order philosophical theories to be taken “seriously.” I argue that segregated meta-philosophical skepticism is not a stable position, and that such skepticism rationally “trickles down” to object-level philosophizing. The position I wish to defend is that philosophy should be seen as primarily a critical practice, yielding self-reflection at the limits of human understanding (wonder), rather than a theoretical endeavor aiming at knowledge. Philosophy should be seen as a critical project, seeking Socratic aporia rather than Aristotelian theoria , the benefit of which is not knowledge but rather the independence of mind and freedom of thought that comes with a commitment to criticism.
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