Mental monism is the philosophical theory that ultimate reality comprises only conscious minds. (It is usually identified with subjective idealism, but there are differing readings of that term, so “mental monism” is preferred.) This is a relatively neglected framework for examining the embodiment of consciousness in physical objects such as brains and computers. There is, however, growing interest in mental monism as other frameworks have faltered in seeking to solve the “Hard Problem” of consciousness. It is therefore timely to re-examine the case for mental monism, and to investigate the possible ways in which the embodiment of conscious minds, natural or artificial, could be modeled within this framework. This paper defends mental monism, and an accompanying paper examines the constraints on models of embodiment within that framework, proposes a biologically plausible model of embodiment in brains, and suggests an extension to embodiment in machines. The conscious mind is characterized as a nonphysical and nonlocal system comprised only of volitions and phenomenal experiences, subject to scientifically discoverable natural laws, and capable of processing information independently of the linked brain tissue.
KeywordsHard ProblemConsciousnessMental MonismIdealismArtificial ConsciousnessConscious AI
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