Research ArticleOpen AccessGoogle Scholar indexed
Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy
Mathematics and Natural Sciences, American University of Kuwait, Safat, Kuwait
- 1 Mathematics and Natural Sciences, American University of Kuwait, Safat, Kuwait
Open Journal of Philosophy·Volume 03 (2013)·Pages 329–336·Published 29 May 2013·DOI10.4236/ojpp.2013.32050
Copy link · social · email
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the probability model used to infer irrationality for the subjects in the famous Linda problem is not appropriate, and I suggest different approaches based on fuzzy reasoning models. My line of argument is two-fold: 1) If the term “probability” is understood properly (mathematically), then the experimenters used the wrong model. 2) If the term “probability” is understood casually (non- mathematically), then alternative models perhaps should be used to justify the subjects’ responses. The objective is to experiment with new ways of looking at irrationality and raise a discussion regarding the relation between irrationality, reasoning errors and logical models that are used as frameworks to study irrationality.
KeywordsProbabilityRationalityIrrationalityFuzzyConjunctionFallacy
- In Buckley, J. J. (2010). Fuzzy probability and statistics (studies in fuzziness and soft computing). New York: Springer.
- Cherniak, C. (1981). Minimal rationality. Mind, XC, 161-183. doi:10.1093/mind/XC.358.161
- Cohen, L. J. (1979). On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the Fallacy? Cognition, 8, 385-407. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(79)90023-4
- Davidson, D. (1980). Psychology as philosophy. In D. Davidson (Ed.), Essays on actions and events. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, D. (1982a). Paradoxes of irrationality. In R. Wollheim, & J. Hopkins (Eds.), Philosophical essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511554636.018
- Davidson, D. (1982b). Rational animals. Dialectica, 36, 317-327. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1982.tb01546.x
- Davidson, D. (1984). On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In D. Davidson (Ed.), Inquiries into truth and interpretation. New York: Oxford Press.
- Davidson, D. (1984). Radical interpretation. In D. Davidson (Ed.), Inquiries into truth and interpretation. New York: Oxford Press.
- Dulany, D. E., & Hilton, D. J. (1991). Conversational implicature, consious representation, and the conjunction fallacy. Social Cognition, 9, 85-110. doi:10.1521/soco.1991.9.1.85
- Fisk, J. E. (2004). Conjunction fallacy. In R. F. Pohl (Ed.), Cognitive illusions: A handbook of fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment, and memory. Hove: Psychology Press.
- Gould, S. J. (1992). Bully for brontosaurus: Reflections in natural history (p. 469). New York: Norton.
- Harten, D. S. (2008). How to solve the conjunction fallacy? A discussion of alternative approaches. Master’s Thesis, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
- Bar-Hillel, M., & Nater, E. (1993). How alike is it vs. how likely is it: A disjunction fallacy in probability judgments. Journal of Perosnality and Social Psychology, 65, 1119-1131. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.6.1119
- Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The “conjunction fallacy” revisited: How intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 275-305. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199912)12:4 3.0.CO;2-M
- Hilton, D. J. (1995). The social context of reasoning: Conversational inference and rational judgment. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 248-271. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.118.2.248