Research ArticleOpen AccessGoogle Scholar indexed
Voluntary Control of Desire
North Carolina Central University, Durham, NC, USA
- 1 North Carolina Central University, Durham, NC, USA
Open Journal of Philosophy·Volume 06 (2016)·Pages 103–109·Published 20 January 2016·DOI10.4236/ojpp.2016.61010
Copy link · social · email
Abstract
In this paper, I will investigate whether there is any way in which our desires or wants are under our voluntary control. I shall argue that even if our desires are not under our voluntary control, there are still significantly many cases in which we can properly be blamed, praised, or upbraided for having certain desires.
KeywordsDesireVoluntaryPraiseBlame
- Alston, W. P. (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology. Atoscadero, CA: Ridgview Publishing Company. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214077
- Audi, R. (1993). Responsible Action and Virtuous Character. Action, Intention, and Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy, 68, 5-20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2024717
- O’Shaughnessy, B. (1973). The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pettit, P., & Smith, M. (1996). Freedom in Belief and Desire. Journal of Philosophy, 93, 429-449. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2940892
- Scott-Kukures, D. (1993). On Belief and the Capacity of the Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LII.
- Williams, B. (1971). Deciding to Believe. Problem of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.