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On the Possibility of Strong Artificial Life
School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
- 1 School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
Open Journal of Philosophy·Volume 08 (2018)·Pages 495–505·Published 17 September 2018·DOI10.4236/ojpp.2018.85034
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Abstract
One of the central problems in philosophy of artificial life (AL) is whether the artificial life entities we create can be genuine life. Proponents of strong AL believe that the artificial life entities exhibiting characteristics of natural life in a physical or a virtual environment can be real life. Opponents of strong artificial life, however, think that artificial life entities are not real life or just simulation of natural life. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate which view of strong artificial life is valid. The method is to use philosophical theory and logics to analyze the opponents’ arguments. The conclusion is that the opponents’ arguments for denying strong AL are insufficient to exclude the possibility of strong AL.
KeywordsStrong Artificial LifeFunctionalismMetabolismMultiple Realizations“Shoes/Fly” Fallacy
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