The Attribution of Unity of Consciousness over Time
- 1 University of Rhode Island, Kingston, USA
Abstract
There is hardly a consensus over attribution of unity to consciousness in terms of experience duration. Mainly, there are two major accounts of the unity over the course of time: diachronic and synchronic. However, the main problem with each of these stances is transitivity problem; that is, one cannot stand with one of these accounts without admitting the other. The way that Tye describes his diachronic account of unity is transitive to the synchronic type. Similarly, Bayne’s confinement to mere synchronic unity faces transitivity problem from synchronic to diachronic type. Dainton’s co-consciousness, also, fails to offer a coherent account to include both synchronic and diachronic unities. To resolve the problems around unity attribution over time, a holistic view, here called “network unity” model is proposed. Using the network account, a coherent scheme of unity relation can be achieved in such a way that both synchronic and diachronic unities can be subsumed by a single conception.
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