Heuristics, Biases and the Psychology of Reasoning: State of the Art — Oak Academic Publishing
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Heuristics, Biases and the Psychology of Reasoning: State of the Art
Department of Social Psychology, Basic Psychology and Methodology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain
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Department of Social Psychology, Basic Psychology and Methodology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain
1 Department of Social Psychology, Basic Psychology and Methodology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain
2 Department of Social Psychology, Basic Psychology and Methodology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Investigations on heuristics and biases have had a great impact on the study of reasoning and related higher cognitive processes, such as judgment and decision making. Specifically, the research in cognitive psychology of reasoning has revealed that people frequently activate mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to make inferences. These are non-logical strategies and could lead subjects to commit systematic deviations from the tenets of normative principles, that is, cognitive biases. The key objective of this paper is to present some of the most relevant theories on heuristics and biases in reasoning, focusing on the dual process theories of deduction. According to these theories, there are two kinds of thinking. Type 1, automatic, unconscious, implicit, fast and effortless and Type 2, reflective, controlled, conscious, explicit, slow and effortful. Much debate on these theories has emphasized on the relationship between both types of processes and the underlying factors that could triggered one or other. In this regard, different dual-process theories propose distinct answers to these questions. The results in the literature have registered that the likelihood of activation of Type 1 and Type 2 processes has important consequences on reasoning, both in experimental laboratory tasks and in everyday situations. Recent empirical investigations that have studied the critical role that intuitive and deliberative processes play in different professional areas are displayed. It is a key question that future research continues with the study of the underlying procedures that professionals activate for reasoning and decision making.
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