When predicting thoughts and behavior of other people, we use either the self as the basis for predictions (i.e., we simulate others), or theoretical knowledge (i.e., we use knowledge about others). To find out whether the prediction of complex choices is possible we asked participants to predict the choice of a well-known or unknown target person in the classic Asian disease framing task, a paradigmatic example of a paradoxical decision. In addition, we collected participants’ self-reports on their prediction strategies (theory or simulation). People’s choice in a framing task was correctly predicted regardless of familiarity. Although familiarity influenced reported strategy, correct predictions were presumably based on simulation, since explicit theoretical knowledge either was irrelevant or non-existent. These findings show that the correct prediction of paradoxical decisions by high-level simulation cannot be ruled as an alternative to prediction by theory.
Adam, M. B., & Reyna, V. (2005). Coherence and Correspondence Criteria for Rationality: Experts’ Estimation of Risks of Sexually Transmitted Infections. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 169-186. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.493
Amodio, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2006). Meeting of Minds: The Medial Frontal Cortex and Social Cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7, 268-277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn1884
Bach, T. (2011). Structure-Mapping: Directions from Simulation to Theory. Philosophical Psychology, 24, 23-51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.533261
Bazinger, C., & Kühberger, A. (2012a). Is Social Projection Based on Simulation or Theory? Why New Methods Are Needed for Differentiating. New Ideas in Psychology, 30, 228-235. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2012.01.002
Bazinger, C., & Kühberger, A. (2012b). Theory Use in Social Predictions. New Ideas in Psychology, 30, 319-321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2012.02.003
Bazinger, C., & Kühberger. A. (2013). Empathy Gaps and Decisions: The Case of Curiosity. In C. Mohyieddini (Ed.), Handbook of Psychology of Emotions: Recent Theoretical Perspectives and Novel Empirical Findings (Volume 2, pp. 189-201). London: Nova Publishers.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2001). Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders. Mind & Language, 16, 493-457. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00179
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil198178268
Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & McKay, R. (2011). Delusional Belief. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 271-298. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131622
Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J. (2010). Abductive Inference and Delusional Belief. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15, 261-287. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546800903439120
Coricelli, G., & Nagel, R. (2009). Neural correlates of depth of strategic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106, 9163-9168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0807721106
Decety, J., & Grèzes, J. (2006). The Power of Simulation: Imagining One’s Own and Other’s Behavior. Brain Research, 1079, 4-14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.115
Dunning, D., & Hayes, A. F. (1996). Evidence for Egocentric Comparison in Social Judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 213-229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.213
Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Vol. xiii). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Gallese, V. (2001). The Shared Manifold Hypothesis. From Mirror Neurons to Empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 33-50.
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 493-501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01262-5
Gallese, V., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011). What Is So Special about Embodied Simulation? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 512-519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003
Gauker, C. (2005). The Belief-Desire Law. Facta Philosophica, 7, 121-144.
Geurts, B. (2013). Alternatives in Framing and Decision Making. Mind & Language, 28, 1-19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mila.12005
Gigerenzer, G. (2015). On the Supposed Evidence for Libertarian Paternalism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6, 361-383. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0248-1
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2002). Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511808098
Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195138929.001.0001
Goldman, A. I. (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind & Language, 24, 235-252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01361.x
Goldman, A. I., & Sebanz, N. (2005). Simulation, Mirroring, and a Different Argument from Error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.05.008
Goldman, A. I., & Sripada, C. (2005). Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition. Cognition, 94, 193-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.01.005
Gopnik, A. (1993). How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 1-14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00028636
Gordon, R. M. (1986). Folk Psychology as Simulation. Mind & Language, 1, 158-171. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x
Heal, J. (1996). Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability. Mind & Language, 11, 44-67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00028.x
Heal, J. (1998). Co-Cognition and Off-Line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach. Mind & Language, 13, 477-498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00088
Hertwig, R., & Volz, K. G. (2013). Abnormality, Rationality, and Sanity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17, 547-549. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.08.011
Hurley, S. (2008). Understanding Simulation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, 755-774. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00220.x
Johnson, J. T. (1987). The Heart on the Sleeve and the Secret Self: Estimations of Hidden Emotion in Self and Acquaintances. Journal of Personality, 55, 563-582. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00452.x
Jou, J., Shanteau, J., & Harris, R. J. (1996). An Information Processing View of Framing Effects: The Role of Causal Schemas in Decision Making. Memory & Cognition, 24, 1-15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03197268
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809477
Karniol, R. (2003). Egocentrism versus Protocentrism: The Status of Self in Social Prediction. Psychological Review, 110, 564-580. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.564
Krienen, F. M., Tu, P.-C., & Buckner, R. L. (2010). Clan Mentality: Evidence That the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Responds to Close Others. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 13906-13915. http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2180-10.2010
Kühberger, A. (1995). The Framing of Decisions: A New Look at Old Problems. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62, 230-240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1046
Kühberger, A. (2002). The Rationality of Risky Decisions. Theory & Psychology, 12, 427-452. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354302012004293
Kühberger, A., Kogler, C., Hug, A., & Mösl, E. (2006). The Role of the Position Effect in Theory and Simulation. Mind & Language, 21, 610-625. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00290.x
Kühberger, A., Perner, J., Schulte, M., & Leingruber, R. (1995). Choice or No Choice: Is the Langer Effect Evidence against Simulation? Mind & Language, 10, 423-436. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00022.x
Langer, E. J. (1975). The Illusion of Control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 311-328. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.32.2.311
Macdonald, R. R. (1986). Credible Conceptions and Implausible Probabilities. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 39, 15-27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8317.1986.tb00842.x
Malle, B. F., & Hodges, S. D. (2005). Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Divide Between Self and Others. New York: Guilford Press.
McKenzie, C. R. M., & Nelson, J. D. (2003). What a Speaker’s Choice of Frame Reveals: Reference Points, Frame Selection, and Framing Effects. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 596-602. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03196520
Nickerson, R. S. (1999). How We Know—And Sometimes Misjudge—What Others Know: Imputing One’s Own Knowledge to Others. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 737-759. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.737
Perner, J., & Brandl, J. L. (2009). Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and collapse. Philosophical Studies, 144, 435-446. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9356-z
Perner, J., & Kühberger, A. (2002). Framing and the Theory-Simulation Controversy. Predicting People’s Decisions. Mind & Society, 3, 65-80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02513148
Perner, J., & Kühberger, A. (2005). Mental Simulation: Royal Roads to Other Minds? In B. F. Malle, & S. D. Hodges (Eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Divide between Self and Others (pp. 174-189). New York: The Guilford Press.
Ravenscroft, I. (2003). Simulation, Collapse and Humean Motivation. Mind & Language, 18, 162-174. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00219
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1991). Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Framing Effects in Choice: Gist Extraction, Truncation, and Conversion. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 4, 249-262. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.3960040403
Saxe, R. (2005). Against Simulation: The Argument from Error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 174-179. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.01.012
Schurz, M., Kogler, C., Scherndl, T., Kronbichler, M., & Kühberger, A. (2015). Differentiating Self-Projection from Simulation during Mentalizing: Evidence from fMRI. PLoS ONE, 10, e0121405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0121405
Shanton, K., & Goldman, I. (2010). Simulation Theory. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1, 527-538. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.33
Sher, S., & McKenzie, C. R. M. (2006). Information Leakage from Logically Equivalent Frames. Cognition, 101, 467-494. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.11.001
Sher, S., & McKenzie, C. R. M. (2008). Framing Effects and Rationality. In N. Chater, & M. Oaksford (Eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science (pp. 79-96). Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216093.003.0004
Stich, S., & Nichols, S. (1992). Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? Mind & Language, 7, 35-71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00196.x
Stich, S., & Nichols, S. (1995). Second Thoughts on Simulation. In M. Davies, & T. Stone (Eds.), Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications (pp. 87-108). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Suzuki, S., Harasawa, N., Ueno, K., Gardner, J. L., Ichinohe, N., Haruno, M., Cheng, K., & Nakahara, H. (2012). Learning to Simulate Others’ Decisions. Neuron, 74, 1125-1137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.030
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1, 39-60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science, 211, 453-458. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683
Wilson, T. D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1978). The Accuracy of Verbal Reports about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior. Social Psychology, 41, 118-131. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3033572