Is it possible to naturalize semantics? Starting from Libet’s 1983 studies, current research developments in neuronal bases of behavior reduce the mind to the brain, with significant implications in reference to issues of free will, imputability and individual behavioral responsibility. However, many criticisms can be made at this approach. This paper shows the limits of Cognitive Neuro-reductionism, especially in the light of Varela’s Systemic Cognitive Neu roscience or Neurophenomenology and the current theoretical revision process of social systems as complex — dynamical , emergent and unpredictable — social systems , or Complex Realism Sociology. Here, there is an agreement point. The conception of living systems as complex system as well as that of social system as complex systems acknowledge the autonomy of human reflexivity capability and free will be able to initiate the chain of events that triggers the process of adaptation to environment and change and social emergence ones, and, in so doing, problematize a neuro-reductionist determinism of cognitive life and behavioral processes, with its dilemmatic consequences on individual social responsibility and, ultimately, on social order possibilities. This being stated, this paper reflects on dialogue possibilities between Varela’s neuroscientific revolution and Complex Realism Sociology. Going beyond the Parsonsian functionalism’s social homeostasis and maintaining the point firm of social emergence and relationship between reflexivity and social morphogenesis, Complex Realism Sociology can dialogue well with Varela’s Neurophenomenology . Lieb ’s disciplined analysis shows to be a fruitful ground for interlocution about the understanding of that Organism which cannot be liquidated but must be reinterpreted in its function, about the understanding of neuronal circuits that mediate free will and intersubjectivity, conscious deliberative intentionality and awareness of oneself and others, self-control, perception of time and risk, in other terms, about the understanding our ability to give meaning to the world, to adapt or change it, to know, remember, desire, empathize, socialize and interact. In Varela’s revision, stripped of problematic reductionist claims, Neuroscience can provide to Sociology a wealth of observations that contribute to the understanding of the bodily basis of social interactions and social order. This paper is within Piaceri ’ s research.
KeywordsCognitive Neuro-ReductionismFree Will and ResponsibilityEnactivismNeurophenomenology
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