Homo moralis : A Neurosociological Theory of Moral Capacity and Social Regulation

Abstract

This article explores the evolutionary and sociocultural foundations of human morality through an interdisciplinary neurosociological framework. It defends the thesis that the capacity for moral judgment is a biologically evolved feature of Homo sapiens , rooted in emotional mechanisms shaped by natural selection. Drawing on theoretical insights from Jonathan Turner, Christopher Boehm, and Francisco Ayala, alongside empirical evidence from neuroscience and behavioral studies, the article argues for a crucial distinction between an innate moral capacity and culturally constructed moral norms. While moral codes vary across societies, they rely on universal neurobiological predispositions to function and endure. Emotions such as shame, guilt, and moral indignation—complex and uniquely human—serve as evolutionary preconditions for moral behavior, facilitating internalized social regulation and the development of complex moral systems. The paper further examines reciprocal altruism as a foundational mechanism for cooperation and moral cognition, linking it to moral realism—the view that certain moral principles possess objective and universal validity. Despite cultural diversity, core moral intuitions emerge early in ontogeny and are observable across species, underscoring their deep evolutionary roots. Ultimately, the article presents morality as a co-evolved phenomenon, emerging from a biologically grounded moral faculty and refined through cultural elaboration, cognitive development, and symbolic representation. This integrative perspective challenges moral relativism and highlights the neurobiological scaffolding underpinning ethical behavior.