Man in Search of Rationality: Neurosociological Foundations of Moral and Economic Decision Making

Abstract

This article develops a neurosociological decision-making model integrating economic sociology, social neuroscience, and Dual-Process cognitive theories. It challenges Rational Choice Theory (RCT) from neoclassical economics by arguing that rational behavior cannot be reduced to utility maximization based on stable preferences and perfect information. Drawing on economic sociology critiques, the paper highlights the social embeddedness of economic action, the constitutive role of cultural norms, and institutional influences. Behavioral economics and social neuroscience findings further demonstrate that emotions are central, not peripheral, to decision-making. The framework builds on Dual-Process models—distinguishing fast, intuitive (System 1) from slow, deliberative (System 2) processes—and extends them by including socially and culturally acquired knowledge. Central to the model is conation, defined as the neurocognitive capacity for adaptive, goal-directed action amid emotional and contextual complexity. Rationality is reconceptualized as a dynamic, context-dependent process arising from the interaction of neural mechanisms and socio-cultural environments. The article proposes three testable hypotheses linking neural activity patterns to moral and rational evaluations across social contexts. By integrating cognitive neuroscience with sociological theory, it establishes a theoretical and methodological foundation for neurosociology and offers a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the cognitive architecture of moral and economic behavior.